Projects
Responsibility and Artificial Intelligence
I am currently writing a book entitled Answering Others. Moral Responsibility and Artificial Intelligence, which is under contract with Hart. Answering Others uses a novel puzzle, the Lorry Driver Paradox, to explore and clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, to break new ground in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI), and to connect moral philosophy, legal theory, and AI ethics in new ways. Answering Others tests the idea that an inquiry into legal responsibility can guide an inquiry into moral responsibility, and not just the other way around. Related work of mine, in the ethics of AI, has appeared, for instance, in the journals AI&Society (here), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (here), The Journal of Applied Philosophy (here), and was also awarded the CEPE IACAP 2021 Best Paper Award (here).
I am currently writing a book entitled Answering Others. Moral Responsibility and Artificial Intelligence, which is under contract with Hart. Answering Others uses a novel puzzle, the Lorry Driver Paradox, to explore and clarify our understanding of moral responsibility, to break new ground in the ethics of artificial intelligence (AI), and to connect moral philosophy, legal theory, and AI ethics in new ways. Answering Others tests the idea that an inquiry into legal responsibility can guide an inquiry into moral responsibility, and not just the other way around. Related work of mine, in the ethics of AI, has appeared, for instance, in the journals AI&Society (here), Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (here), The Journal of Applied Philosophy (here), and was also awarded the CEPE IACAP 2021 Best Paper Award (here).
The Ethics of Consent
In a series of articles, I focused on consent and in particular on the conditions that make consent voluntary. These articles include my work on consent and coercion (here in The Journal of Moral Philosophy), consent and manipulation (here in Philosophical Studies), and consent and organ donation (here in The Journal of Medical Ethics). I also wrote a monograph on the ethics of consent, which is entitled Voluntary Consent: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2023: click here). In this book, I argue that consent is voluntary unless it is motivated by an influence that cannot be interpersonally justified. This view takes voluntariness to be the default position and does not require any particular mental act on the part of the consenter, such as a volition or act of will. Moreover, I argue that voluntariness is neither a ‘psychological’ concept indicative of the inner states of a person’s mind (e.g. willingness or reluctance) nor a ‘circumstantial’ concept indicative of a person’s set of options. Rather, it is an ‘interpersonal’ concept focusing on the interaction between the person giving consent and the person receiving it and requiring the absence of illegitimate control by the consent-receiver.
In a series of articles, I focused on consent and in particular on the conditions that make consent voluntary. These articles include my work on consent and coercion (here in The Journal of Moral Philosophy), consent and manipulation (here in Philosophical Studies), and consent and organ donation (here in The Journal of Medical Ethics). I also wrote a monograph on the ethics of consent, which is entitled Voluntary Consent: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2023: click here). In this book, I argue that consent is voluntary unless it is motivated by an influence that cannot be interpersonally justified. This view takes voluntariness to be the default position and does not require any particular mental act on the part of the consenter, such as a volition or act of will. Moreover, I argue that voluntariness is neither a ‘psychological’ concept indicative of the inner states of a person’s mind (e.g. willingness or reluctance) nor a ‘circumstantial’ concept indicative of a person’s set of options. Rather, it is an ‘interpersonal’ concept focusing on the interaction between the person giving consent and the person receiving it and requiring the absence of illegitimate control by the consent-receiver.